Brighton 2019/20: Reel around the Fountain


Getting to the Premier League is an expensive business as many clubs in the Championship have found out, with operating losses in that division exceeding £600 million pre-Covid.

Remaining in the Premier League can also be costly, as Brighton have proven in announcing their 2019/20 financial results.


All clubs divide their revenue into three categories, matchday, broadcast and commercial.

Having matches taking place behind closed doors at the end of the season meant that Brighton’s matchday revenue fell by over a quarter to £13.5 million.

Albion make about £1 million per home match, more so against the big teams, and so this meant that they are likely to have a financial hit of about £18 million in 2020/21, assuming that there are no matches played before a paying audience for the remainder of the season.

Matchday income historically made up about 13% of Brighton’s total revenue in the Premier League, but it was over half of the total when the club was in the Championship.

Premier League clubs can only increase matchday income by increasing prices, capacity or the number of events that take place at the stadium, until the fallout from the pandemic ceases then clubs collectively are set to lose about £700m from this source.

Overall attendances averaged 30,359 in 2019/20, down 0.2% pre-lockdown, the club has the intention to increase the capacity slightly at the Amex but there is a natural ceiling of about 32,000 without a huge infrastructure cost.

There is limited opportunity for Brighton to host other events at the Amex, so if the club wants to increase matchday income it will have to find ways of increasing the average spend from corporate and hospitality customers.

The other clubs who have published their 2020 accounts (in red above) have all reported decreases of about 20% in matchday revenues.

Earnings from sponsorship historically have been mainly from American Express and Nike for Brighton, but in addition the club generated over £10m from a property development called New Monks Farm close to their training facilities in Lancing, as well as increased loan income for the season.

Revenue from commercial activities is very much concentrated in the hands of the ‘Big Six’ clubs, who between them earn 77% of the total.

Half the clubs in the Premier League have gambling companies as sponsors who historically have paid more than other industries for the non ‘Big Six’ clubs but Brighton seem to have bucked the trend by aiming for a long term relationship with American Express which seems to have paid off.

Albion, like all Premier League clubs, benefit from the Premier League’s record breaking broadcasting deals, but had a 21% fall from this source in 2019/20.

Six matches in 2019/20 took place after the club’s 30 June year end and so the full season’s broadcast income was reduced to 32/38 of the total broadcast income for the season, which means in 2020/21 it should be 44/38 of the usual amount.

A complex formula is used to divide Premier League broadcast money between clubs, based on fixed sums split evenly, appearances on television and the final league position, plus some clubs earn extra through qualifying for UEFA competitions.

Finishing in fifteenth position in the Premier League meant that Brighton earned just under £4m more from the positional pot than the previous season, but this was offset by an estimated £330m rebate to broadcasters plus not finishing all matches by 30 June 2020.

Rebates to broadcasters are likely to be spread over three years, probably in the form of Sky, BT Sport and others paying slightly less than their originally agreed fees, how this will be split between the clubs is still uncertain.

Every other club who had reported their accounts to date for 2019/20 has shown substantially lower broadcast revenues, so whilst Brighton are bottom of the table at present, this is likely to change in due course.

Nestling towards the bottom of the total revenue table is to be expected for Brighton, they were 14th and 15th in the previous two seasons in the Premier League following promotion.


Club costs mainly relate to players, in the form of wages and transfers.

Having been promoted in 2017 Brighton’s costs in their first season in the Premier League increased more slowly than income, allowing the club to make a profit, but this initial benefit reversed in the second season and losses accelerated further in 2019/20.

Life as a footballer generates much comment, but statistical analysis suggests that you tend to get what you pay for in football, overall wages stabilised for Brighton in 2019/20, some players went out on loan, others left, and were replaced by others on broadly similar salaries.

Locadia, Knockaert and Andone went out of loan, freeing up wages to bring in Maupay, Lamptey and Webster, allowing the overall wage bill to be static.

Another reason why wages have not increased is that bonuses for the last six matches of the season are not included as these matches took place after 30 June.

Moving from League One football at ‘The’ Withdean to the Premier League in the Amex stadium has seen wages rise by 1,353% over the last decae, but they are still modest by comparision with the rest of the division, with average wages of £48,000 a week.

A percentage of revenue basis shows Brighton’s wages in 2019/20 were the fourth lowest relative to income in the last decade.

Chief executive Paul Barber, on the list of many a head hunter if media reports are correct, saw his pay rise to over £2million, including a loyalty bonus, which is less than the average player salary of £2.49 million.

Amortisation is the other main player related cost and this is total transfer fees spread over contract life, so the signing of Adam Webster for £20 million on a four year deal works out as an annual amortisation cost of £5 million (unless you’re Derby County, in which case it is mysteriously lower).

Luckily for Brighton some players, such as Solly March and Lewis Dunk have come through the ranks at the club and so there is no amortisation cost, which has still increased on the back of the signings of Webster, Maupay and Lamptey.


Losses (and profits) are income less costs and Brighton’s operating (day to day) loss of £64 million may surprise some but the figure reflects the impact of Covid-19, which the club estimated contributed £25 million for the year.

Everton, Southampton and Spurs have also published significant operating losses for 2019/20 and this trend is likely to be repeated for the vast majority of established clubs in the division.

Due to player sales profits, these losses can be reduced, but Brighton made no return from this activity in 2020, although the club now have a large number of players who could be sold for sizeable fees should there be interest from other clubs.

A club can therefore convert losses into profits from player sales (Crystal Palace did this in 2019 with the sale of Wan-Bissaka) but there are no guarantees of such profits, which tend to vary from season to season.

Player trading

Detailed breakdowns of player signings are never given in Premier League club accounts but Brighton spent over £55 million in 2019/20, taking their total spending to £191 million.

A Premier League club has to continually invest in players and Brighton’s total squad cost hit £200 million by 30 June 2020, which may increase slightly again in 2020/21

Making money from player sales is important for cash flow purposes, but Brighton have had a policy of keeping theirs since arriving in the Premier League.


Brighton have been dependent upon owner Tony Bloom for over a decade. He originally was providing money for signings (such as Glenn Murray from Rochdale in 2007 for £300k) behind the scenes but since becoming chairman has underwritten the cost of the stadium, training ground and operational losses to a total of £394 million.

This investment in split between interest free loans and shares, and 2018/19 was no exception as he lent the club a further £37 million to provide funds for further infrastructure and player spending.

Whilst no doubt Bloom wants the club to be self sufficient at some point, at present his benevolence has advanced the club from the wrong end of League One to a fourth season in the Premier League. More investment may be required if his stated aim of a regular top ten place in the Premier League is achieved.

In addition Brighton have taken advantage of government schemes to delay paying taxation, which has increased the tax creditor from £6m to £26m, and transfer creditor have risen from £12m to £37 million, suggesting that the signings of the Maupay, Webster and Co have been made on an instalment basis.


So, where does this leave Brighton? Since arriving in the Premier League four clubs (Fulham, Cardiff, Huddersfield, Norwich ) also promoted from the Championship in or since 2017 have been relegated.

Fans have been impressed with the style of football under new manager Graham Potter, but poor home form has caused grumbles on social media. Avoiding relegation in 2020/21 is important in a Covid-19 world where matchday income is uncertain for the foreseeable future.

Brighton are fortunate to have an owner in Tony Bloom who has a strategy for the club and as such is unlikely to indulge in some of the madcap short term schemes that have left many in the EFL looking very vulnerable.

Brighton 2018/19: Switch


As easy as riding a bike

A lot of money is required to get to the Premier League, but as the 2018/19 Brighton and Hove Albion accounts reveal, it takes a lot to stay there too.

Losses of £21 million were announced for the year to 30 June 2019, reversing a profit of £12 million the previous season as the club finished in 17th position in the table.

Investment in players was the main reason for the deterioration in the financial results, as well as some one off costs following Chris Hughton’s sacking the day after the season ended.


Just ten years ago Brighton’s income was £5 million for the whole season, but this had increased to £143 million by 2019.

A football club generates income from three main sources, matchday, commercial and broadcasting.

Having sold out matches at the Amex for the club’s two seasons in the Premier League matchday income was static in 2018/19.

A club can only increase matchday income by increasing prices, capacity or the number of events that take place at the stadium.

No league attendances fell below 29,600 last season as the club sold out most home matches at the Amex stadium and whilst there were three cup matches at home these were at discounted prices so had little impact on total matchday revenue.

Brighton’s matchday income put it 12th in the Premier League table (note figures are for 2017/18 for most clubs as they haven’t yet published their accounts) which is intuitively higher than you might expect with the club being above the likes of Everton and Leicester.

A look at the small print of club accounts however reveals that some clubs treat the likes of merchandise and hospitality boxes as matchday income and others as commercial, which makes a 100% accurate comparison impossible.

Keeping attendances at close to capacity is a tricky exercise and means that Brighton cannot increase ticket prices too aggressively in case fans revolt.

Sponsorship income mainly comes from American Express and Nike for Brighton and this increased by 7% in 2018/19 but should accelerate due to a revised Amex deal worth an estimated £100 million over the next decade compared to £1.5m a year at present.

Half the clubs in the Premier League have gambling companies as sponsors who historically have paid more than other industries for the non ‘Big Six’ clubs but Brighton seem to have bucked the trend by aiming for a long term relationship with American Express which seems to have paid off.

Income from broadcasting is the main source for non Big-Six teams and Brighton are no exception and last year benefitted from an improved Premier League overseas deal plus an FA Cup run to the semi finals.

Seventeenth position in the Premier League meant that Brighton earned £4m less from the prize pot but this was offset by the other issues, meaning that almost four pounds in every five came from broadcasting.

Total income for Brighton was therefore a record £143 million, but this was not sufficient to prevent them losing money last season and still puts them in the bottom half of Premier League clubs.

Player Costs

Having been promoted in 2017 Brighton’s costs in their first season in the Premier League increased more slowly than income, allowing the club to make a profit, but this benefit reversed last season as Sir Alan Sugar’s ‘prune juice’ comment was evident and wages absorbed more and more revenue.

Every fan knows that player costs are the most significant expense for a football club and this is the main reason why Brighton lost money in 2018/19.

Player’s wages were the main driver of the bill increasing by over 30% to £101 million last season, as new contracts for Dunk, Duffy and Gross, plus the signing of Jahanbaksh, Bernardo, Montoya, Andone, Burn, Bissouma, Button, MacAllister, Tau and others came in with Premier League wage expectations.

Even so, Brighton’s total wage bill is still relatively modest by Premier League standards, and the total cost for the season for all 20 clubs could top £3 billion for 2018/19 once all the remaining clubs publish their accounts.

Relative to every £100 in income Brighton paid out in £71 wages last season, UEFA have a ‘red line’ of £70 although this is far lower than the majority of their time in the Championship.

Some fans may remember Brighton’s first season in the top division in 1979/80 wheret the wage bill for all whole staff was £785,000, equivalent to what the average Brighton first team player earned last season in four months.

In the content of the Premier League as a whole Brighton’s wages are still quite modest, partly as a legacy of being relatively recently promoted and this puts them in the main bunch of provincial clubs in the division.

Amortisation is the other player expense, which is calculated as transfer fees spread over contract life, so the signing of Ali Jahanbaksh for £16 million on a five-year deal works out as an annual amortisation cost of £3.2 million (unless you’re Derby County, in which case it is mysteriously lower).

Nevertheless, despite the amortisation charge increasing by 500% since promotion in 2017 Brighton’s total of £33m again places them, as you would expect from a squad that still has a number of Championship and academy/youth signings, towards the bottom of the Premier League table in regards to this expense category.


Profit (and losses) are calculated as income less costs and Brighton’s pre-tax loss of £22 million may have surprised some but the figure was impacted by the cost of sacking Chris Hughton and paying compensation to Swansea for Graham Potter.

‘Exceptional’ items as the above management changes are called are usually set out in detail by Premier League clubs (such as Manchester United sacking Mourinho for £19.6m and Arsenal having £3.1m in their 2018/19 accounts too) but Brighton are notoriously coy when it comes to disclosures and have frustratingly not disclosed any details here.

Losses would have been higher had it not been for selling some fringe players which generated modest profits, without these Brighton’s losses would have been £24.6 million.

Everton made the highest losses in the Premier League of over £1 million a week in 2018 and what may surprise many is that only a Norfolk handful of clubs made a profit, relying on owner bailouts and player sales to cover the losses.

Player trading

Brighton’s singings detailed above cost a combined £78 million in 2018/19 although their impact on the pitch can best be described as ‘mixed’ none of them made a huge impact on the pitch. This took the total cost of the squad to £152 million.

In the summer 2019 window Brighton bought Maupay, Webster, Trossard and Clarke, but again, unlike most Premier League clubs, frustratingly didn’t disclose the gross or net spend in the window.


Brighton have been dependent upon owner Tony Bloom for over a decade. He originally was providing money for signings (such as Glenn Murray from Rochdale in 2007 for £300k) behind the scenes but since becoming chairman has underwritten the cost of the stadium, training ground and operational losses to a total of £352 million.

This investment is split between interest free loans and shares, and 2018/19 was no exception as he lent the club a further £49 million to provide funds for further infrastructure and player spending.

Whilst no doubt Bloom wants the club to be self sufficient at some point, at present his benevolence has advanced the club from the wrong end of League One to a third season in the Premier League. More investment may be required if his stated aim of a regular top ten place in the Premier League is achieved.


So, where does this leave Brighton? The achievement of getting to and staying in the Premier League had worn off for both fans and owner last season as Chris Hughton’s pragmatic but unlovable football during the second half of the season ultimately led to his dismissal.

The club still needs time to establish itself in the Premier League and no doubt has seen how the likes of Sunderland, Middlesbrough and Stoke have struggled when relegated to the Championship.

Fans have been impressed with the style of football under new manager Graham Potter, but with a very compacted middle part of the table two or three consecutive wins or defeats can have a club such as Brighton eyeing up Europa Cup or relegation spots.

The losses made by Brighton last seaon do perhaps suggest that those who think that buying a club in the Championship or League One and underwriting losses to get to the Premier League are probably chasing fool’s gold.

Brighton are fortunate to have an owner in Tony Bloom who has a strategy for the club and as such is unlikely to indulge in some of the madcap short term schemes that have left many in the EFL looking very vulnerable. Those club owners gambling on selling stadia, unusual sponsorship deals and creative accounting are taking a huge risk.

Brighton 2017/18: What Do I Get?


Tony Bloom, Brighton’s owner, probably heaved a sigh of relief in 2017/18, not just because his team had been promoted, but for the first time in living memory the club made a profit.

Over the six initial seasons that Brighton had played in the Championship at the Amex stadium, the Albion had lost £110 million.

Nevertheless, Bloom still ended up lending the club £32 million in 2017/18 as he underwrote investment in new players and capital projects.

Yet for some Brighton fans this benevolence from Bloom is not enough, and recent tantrums and whines on social media suggest that some fans will always want more, especially if someone else if footing the bill.

Key figures for year to 31 May 2018: Brighton and Hove Albion Holdings Limited

Income £139.4 million (up 378%).

Wages £77.6 million (up 148%) .

Operating profit £12.8 million (previous year loss of £38.9 million)

Player signings £57.5 million

Player sales £3.5 million

Tony Bloom investment £318 million (up £32 million).


Brighton, like all clubs generate money from three main sources, matchday, broadcasting and commercial, and whilst the figures for 2017/18 were a record for the club, they are still relatively low compared to those clubs who are regularly competing in European competitions and have global fanbases.

Love it or loathe it, broadcasting income is the main driver of income for a club such as the Albion, and the difference between clubs in the EFL and the EPL is part of the reason why clubs in the Championship are losing nearly £400 million a season as they seek the end of the rainbow in the division above.

Overseas and domestic broadcasters are prepared to pay top prices for Premier League rights at they have discovered that this is the one product that minimises viewers cancelling their subscriptions.

Only a quarter of Brighton’s income came from TV in the Championship, but this rose to four-fifths in the Premier League, and some clubs are even more exposed to this income source.

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Many critics of the Premier League claim that broadcast income levels are a bubble and will burst, bankrupting clubs who are dependent upon it in the process, but there is little evidence to support the view that we are near the end of the road for the likes of BT and Sky paying billions to cover the game live.

Selling TV rights at a loss when the Premier League was started in 1992/3 had proved to be a masterstroke, as the value of those rights has subsequently increased to about a billion pounds a year.

Brighton’s matchday income rose substantially in 2017/18, although we suspect that part of the increase is due to changing what is included in the split of matchday and commercial income totals.

Less fixtures in the division would in theory result in less income, but a combination of increased average attendances (up from 27,966 to 30,403) and higher matchday prices led to a 25% increase.

Unlike most other clubs, Brighton’s ticketing policy includes subsidised travel to and from the Amex stadium for those that want it, so a direct comparison with clubs of a similar ground capacity is not entirely valid.

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Even so, Brighton generated more matchday income than the likes of Leicester, who won the Premier League in 2016, and had £10m more from this source than half a dozen competitors, and this was partially due to the club’s ability to monetise the fanbase compared to previous years.

As a newcomer to the division, Brighton were slightly constrained by existing commercial deals, and according to Nick Harris’s excellent SportingIntelligence website have a very low value shirt sponsorship arrangement with American Express compared to the going rate for the Premier League.

Nevertheless, commercial income rose by a quarter to over £10 million, but the club is a pauper compared to the riches earned by the self-styled ‘Big Six’.

Despite the relative lack of commercial income, Brighton have fared reasonably well in the Premier League overall, finishing 12th in our initial total income table, although this may change as more clubs announce their 2018 results.

What is likely to be the biggest driver of income change for 2018/19 is the club’s final league position, as this is worth £1.9 million for every extra place in the league that the club finishes.


Having a place in the Premier League means that expenses rise too, and the main drivers here relate to players, in the form of wages and transfer fee amortisation.

Increasing a wage bill by nearly 150% would be considered madness in most industries, but football is like no other, and to compete the club has had to pay the going rates.

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There were new contracts given to some of the players central to Brighton being promoted from the Championship in 2016.17, such as Dunk, Duffy, Stephens, Knockaert and Bruno, as well as new signings joining the club whose agents have a rough idea of the going rate for the division.

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Even so, wages rose slower than income, and this resulted in Brighton’s wage/income percentage nearly halving, as the club paid out £56 in wages for every £100 in income, comapred to £107 the previous season (and there were substantial promotion bonuses paid out on top of this sum too).

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As a rule of thumb Premier League clubs are usually deemed to be running well if the wage to income ratio is below 60%, so Brighton have achieved this objective in their first season.

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Relative to their peer group, Brighton seem to have wages under control and have not thrown money at the issue of avoiding relegation.

Married to the cost of player wages is the transfer fee amortisation expense, which arises when a player signs for a club and the accountants spread the transfer fee over the contract life.

Yearly amortisation fees represent a less volatile measure of a club’s transfer policy, which can be distorted by big purchases in one year followed by a period of relative austerity, and so give a better long-term guide to investment in the playing squad.

Brighton’s amortisation cost for the year more than tripled, as the club broke its transfer record many times on Ryan, Propper, Izquierdo, and Locadia over the course of the season. Therefore, when Davy Propper signed for an estimated £10 million on a four-year contract, this works out as an amortisation charge of £2.5 million a year.

By Premier League standards the amortisation cost is relatively low, reflecting that the club is in its first year in the division and has also kept faith with players recruited at Championship prices and therefore lower amortisation fees.

Directors’ pay

It was not just the players who benefitted from Brighton’s promotion. CEO Paul Barber saw his pay package increase to over £1.4 million, reflecting the faith that Tony Bloom has in him and the fact that he was coveted by other clubs in the division, such as Liverpool.

Barber attracts some hysterical reactions from sections of the Brighton fanbase, who seem to think he is the spawn of Beelzebub. His email replies to fan complaints are legendary in length, and whilst his dedication to communication is to be commended in many regards, when fans want nothing but appeasement for the personal slights that they take when some decisions are made, he may struggle to make much headway with their views. Every village has an idiot, and there are a lot of villages in Sussex, all of whom seem to enjoy writing letters of complaint to the Brighton CEO.

The Premier League is a law to itself when it comes to executive pay, there seems to be little indication of what is the going rate, and some of the figures quoted, especially for clubs that purport to give no money to the big cheeses, are best described as ‘unusual’ but are likely to get the investigative journalists at Der Spiegel busy going through leaked emails.

Profits and Losses

Profits/losses are income less costs, and the headline figure for Brighton was a £12.8 million last season, or £350,000 a week. This figure is distorted by a couple of factors though.

Whilst the club kept the vast majority of the squad from the Championship, a few players were sold and this generated profits of £3.4 million, The nature of player sales profits is that all of the profit is shown in the year of sales (unlike player purchases which are spread over the contract) and so create erratic and unpredictable figure.

In 2016/17 the club paid out £9.1 million in promotion bonuses, as Tony Bloom rewarded all employees at the club, not just the playing staff, for taking the Albion to the top flight. Such bonuses distorted the results for that season as they are non-recurring in nature.

Stripping out the above two distortions gives something called EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) profit, which is a more balanced look at what recurring profits would be.

This shows the alarming state of trying to compete in the Championship and gives a more nuanced measure of the benefits of promotion, which are effectively £40 million comparing 2018 to 2017.It also reinforces the view that Brighton would have had to cut back significantly in the playing squad by selling players had they not been promoted the previous season to comply with EFL FFP.

Player trading:

According to the accounts Brighton spent over £57 million in 2017/18 on player signings, a club record. This doesn’t necessarily buy you a lot in the present Premier League market though.

Compared to their peer group, Brighton’s spending was reasonable but unspectacular.

Since the end of the season the board have backed Chris Hughton, with another £50-60 million being spent on new signings.

Funding the club

Tony Bloom’s total investment increase in 2017/18 as he lent the club £32 million. These loans realistically stand little chance of being repaid under present circumstances unless the club starts to make significantly higher profits, although there is little sign of Bloom wanting his money returned. The good news is that the loans, unlike some from directors at Premier League clubs, are interest free.

Whilst fans may scratch their heads at how he had to lend the club money in a year when it made a profit, Bloom repaid the Albion’s overdraft at Barclays Bank (£16 million at start of season), only a fraction of the cost of new players was reflected in the amortisation charge, and the club also spent nearly £10 million in upgrading the Amex stadium and other infrastructure projects.

This takes his total investment to £318 million, in the form of shares and loans.


Brighton’s approach under Bloom of concentrating on the infrastructure first (stadium and training facilities, followed by squad investment) paid dividends in 2017 and the club was able to capitalise with a solid if unspectacular first season in the Premier League.

With the fifth lowest wage budget in the division, a relegation scrap is going to be the order of the day for a few seasons, but provided Bloom keeps his nerve and faith in Chris Hughton, then there is a fair chance of making some progress.

Whether the pitch fork element of the fan base has such patience (and they are not the ones who were subsidising the club for tens of millions in the Championship) is another matter.

Brighton and Hove Albion. Please, please, please, let me get what I want

Brighton and Hove Albion: Please, please, please, let me get what I want.

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Introduction: Bigmouth strikes again.

This report will focus on the cost of Brighton being promoted to the Premier League in the six years since they’ve moved to the Amex stadium in 2011.

Key figures for 2016/17: Panic

Income £29.2m (up 18.3%).

Wages £31.3m* (up 11.0%) *excludes £9.1million bonus paid to staff upon promotion, would be a 42.9% increase if bonus included.

Losses before player sales £38.9 million (up 50.1%)

Player signings £19.0 million

Player sales £ 0.3 million

Tony Bloom investment £280 million

The Albion just missed out on promotion at the end of 2015/16, first on goal difference to Middlesbrough, and then via the playoffs following a match at Hillsborough in which four players limped off injured in the first hour.

Chairman and professional poker player Tony Bloom was therefore faced with a dilemma at the start of 2016/17. Sell some of their players who were being courted by other teams (Dale Stephens and newly promoted Burnley, Lewis Dunk and small Premier League outfit Crystal Palace, Antony Knockaert and just relegated Newcastle), or stick with them and go all in for one final promotion push.

He knew the latter would be a gamble, as if the club didn’t achieve promotion in 2016/17 it would have had to scale back its investment in the playing squad the following season to comply with financial fair play (FFP).

Bloom’s experience of when to go ‘all in’ worked, he backed Chris Hughton by turning down offers, investing in the squad, and was rewarded with promotion.

Income: Frankly, Mr Shankly

Total income for the season was £29.2 million. To put this in context, the three clubs relegated from the Premier League, Aston Villa, Newcastle and Norwich, each earned about £50 million in parachute payments. The sum is also four times the amount the Albion were generating when playing at the Withdean stadium prior to the move to the Amex in 2011.

Whilst we don’t have figures for most of the clubs for 2016/17, as the Albion are one of the first to announce their results, the table below, based on 2015/16 data, gives a rough indication of just how difficult it is to compete for those clubs without parachute payments.

Football clubs generate cash from three main sources, matchday, broadcasting and commercial.

Matchday income from ticket sales rose 14% to £10.7 million. This was due to attendances at the Amex increasing to 27,966 from 25,583.

Broadcasting income rose 48% to 8.1million. This was due to the ‘solidarity payment’ paid by the Premier League to the English Football League increasing from £2.3 million to £4.3 million as a result of a new domestic TV deal for 2016/19 secured by Sky and BT Sport. In addition, the club is estimated to earn £100,000 for each home game and £10,000 for every away game broadcast live on Sky. With the Albion being in the two top all season, they were regulars on television too.

Other income, mainly commercial and retail, rose by a modest 7%.

Promotion to the Premier League will have a major impact on those figures. Benchmarking against Stoke City, the only club of a similar size who have published their 2016/17 figures to date, we would anticipate matchday income to rise by about 10%, commercial/other income to double, and broadcasting income to be somewhere between £95-£120 million in 2017/18, depending upon how often the club appears on TV, and the final league position.

To get a rough idea of the increments involved, if a club appears on live TV more than ten times they get about £1 million for each additional appearance, and there is prize money for finishing in every position in the Premier League that increases by just under £2 million for each place up the table, so the difference between finishing 11th and 16th is therefore about £10 million.

Costs: Stop me if you think you’ve heard this one before

The main costs for a club are in relation to players, and come in the form of wages and player amortisation.

Wages in total rose by 43% to £40.3 million. Included in this figure is a £9.1 million promotion bonus paid to all 288 staff members, both playing and operational, by Tony Bloom. Excluding the bonus wages would have risen by a more modest, but still challenging 10.6%.

This means that wages (excluding bonuses) were 107% of income, or to put it in more simple terms, Brighton paid out £107 in wages for every £100 they generated from revenue.

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In the Championship as a whole, this puts the club at slightly more than average wage payers, compared to 101% for the division as a whole.

Whilst the increase in wages was substantial, it is still significantly less than those of relegated Norwich, who paid out £55.1 million in 2016/17.

This may explain why Alex Pritchard, who had apparently had agreed to sign for Brighton in summer 2016 for a then record fee of up to £8 million, mysteriously made a last-minute decision to sign for Norwich as he headed back up the motorway to his then host club Spurs.

Pritchard then took on the role of pantomime villain for the 2016/17 season in the eyes of many Brighton fans, for making exactly the same decision they would have made themselves under the circumstances.

The wages paid also perhaps put paid to the claims made by former manager Gus Poyet, who said the club had ‘hit the ceiling’ in terms of wages in 2013.

In recent years it has been an expensive business in terms of wages for clubs to fund promotion. Neither Newcastle nor Huddersfield have as yet published their accounts for 2016/17, so not possible to compare the Albion to the other promoted teams.

The other player related expense is that of player amortisation. This is the cost of signing a player spread over the length of his contract. Brighton broke their transfer record in summer 2016 in signing Shane Duffy from Blackburn, for a fee rumoured to be £3.5 million, on a four-year contract. This gives an annual amortisation charge of £875,000 (£3.5m/4).

The advantage of focussing on amortisation instead of just looking at transfer fees is that it removes some of the volatility from making one big signing in a single year.

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Albion’s amortisation increased significantly in 2011/12 with the then record signings on Will Hoskins, Will Buckley and Craig Mackail-Smith as the club was promoted and moved to the new stadium.

In then plateaued for the next three years before Tony Bloom backed Chris Hughton and sanctioned a modest increase in 2015/16, then making an extra commitment in the summer 2016 window.

Other costs: Well I wonder

The club has significant other costs operating from the Amex stadium. Land and buildings have a balance sheet value of £134 million. This includes £2.5 million spent during the year, which is probably in respect of property close to the training facilities at Lancing.

The stadium and other property costs are being written off over 50 years, but to this is added the costs of depreciating shorter life assets such as office equipment. This gives an overall depreciation charge of £4.4 million, down 10% on the previous year, but still higher than many other clubs in older stadia, constructed at a much lower cost. (Norwich’s was less than half that of the Albion, at £1.9 million, for example).

The Albion have a unique cost in terms of transport. Because of the sustainable transport policy that was a condition of planning permission being granted, the club has to contribute significantly to the local train and bus companies to provide free transport to and from home games. This cost is unknown but is estimated to be in the region of £2.5 million.

Director Pay: Barberism begins at home

One expense that will perhaps result in comment is the remuneration of chief executive Paul Barber, who joined the club over five years ago.

Barber’s pay more than doubled to over £1.2 million. Part of this was performance and bonus related, part of it was to prevent other clubs headhunting him. It was publicised in The Times that PB was on Liverpool’s radar when they were looking to replace Ian Ayre, their chief executive. Ayre’s package at Liverpool was…£1.2 million

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We’ve had some dealings with PB here at the Price of Football, and our view is he’s worth every penny. There can be few chief executives of what is now a £140 million a year business who will reply to every email they receive, and engage in fan debate to the degree that Barber has done during his time at the club.

Ultimately if Tony Bloom thinks Paul Barber is worth the money then that’s more than good enough for us. We don’t always agree with the decisions made, but then I don’t always agree with decisions made by my wife either, and still manage to think she’s wonderful.

For some reason PB generates a hysterical reaction from the Mavis Reilly element of the fanbase, who use any excuse to give him stick. We find such behaviour bewildering.

Losses: Hand in glove

Losses are income less costs, and were £38.9 million last season. This was an increase of £13 million from 2015/16. The losses were underwritten by Tony Bloom, to the tune to £107,000 a day.

Since moving to the Amex the Albion have racked up total losses of £118 million in trying to achieve promotion to the Premier League.

Some of you may by querying how the club has complies with financial fair play (FFP), which restricts losses to £39 million over three seasons, so it must average £13 million a season.

FFP is calculated using a different formula to the accounting losses, and some expenses, such as infrastructure, promotion, women’s and academy football, community schemes and so on are excluded.

Whilst the Albion don’t detail all of these costs, they have stated that they were FFP compliant in 2016/17. We’ve asked around some of our chums in football, and have calculated the following FFP loss for 2016/17.

The above suggests that the Albion were probably at their limit in terms of complying with the FFP rules in 2016/17, and would probably have had to make some player sales in 2017/18 in order to ensure they satisfied the three year figure of £39 million.

FFP in the Premier League is more relaxed, and of more concern to the club will be satisfying the wage control limits of STCC (Short term cost control) that only allow a Premier League club to increase the wage bill by £7 million a season, plus any rises in non-broadcast income

Player trading: Never had no one ever

According to the accounts the Albion paid out £19 million in 2016/17 on player additions.

On the face of it these seems much higher than the sums being quoted in the press, as the main signings were Shane Duffy (quoted at the time as going for a then record £3.5 million), Glenn Murray (£3 million), and Oliver Norwood, (£2m), although the club, as one would perhaps expect from a business owned by a professional poker player, keep their cards close to their chest and don’t disclose actual numbers.

We suspect the discrepancy is because many signings came with conditions in which extra fees kicked in should the Albion be promoted, and these payouts therefore became due at the end of 2016/17.

£19 million is a record sum for the Albion, more than double of any previous season, it’s a reasonably high figure for a Championship club, but not if compared to the amounts spent last season by clubs relegated from the Premier League in Aston Villa (£76 million) Newcastle (£57 million) and Norwich (£20 million).

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The club did appear to retrench in 2013 and 2014, partly due to tighter FFP rules, but as these were relaxed in 2015/16 spending has been modest, but perhaps more importantly, of mainly high quality. Previous years signings in the likes of Knockaert, Stephens, Murphy, Baldock, Hemed, Stockdale and so on can all be considered to be bargains.

Spending during the 2017 summer window has resulted in the club transfer record being broken three times. Most Premier League clubs do disclose in the accounts the amount spent (sometimes gross, sometimes net) in the window, in what is called the ‘post balance sheet events’ note, and we’re disappointed (actually probably just nosey) in that the Albion have not followed suit here.

The club have also spent £15.7 million in respect of buying land for development next to the training ground in Lancing. Once this is converted into retail and housing stock this could be a very useful additional source of income for the club. The hotel once proposed for the Amex site seems to presently be on the back burner.

The Owner: Handsome Devil

Tony Bloom’s total investment increased further in 2016/17 as he lent the club £28.2 million in the year. He underwrote the losses incurred, which was the equivalent of subsidising every ticket sold at the Amex in the Championship by £60 per match.

This takes his total investment to just over £280 million, in the form of shares and interest free loans. In addition to Bloom’s loans, the club also had racked up an overdraft of over £16 million by the end of May 2017, probably to pay out the staff bonuses as a result of promotion.

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Some fans are muttering about him selling out at a profit to a mythical Chinese or Middle Eastern investor. There’s no evidence to support this as (a) he’s a local lad (who just so happened to be a billionaire through his mathematical genius mind) who clearly loves the club, and travels to matches by train with the fans, and (b) he wouldn’t get his money back, as the club is worth less than the sum he invested.

Premier League status should allow him to stop having to subsidise the club as the extra monies of the Premier League should enable the club to break even (Stoke, for example, a club of similar size, made a profit of just £3 million in 2016/17).

Bloom remains the club’s biggest asset, as his devotion and decision making have proven to date have been exemplary. That also makes him the biggest risk, as if anything were to happen to him then the status of the club’s loans, for example, is unknown.

As a fan, all I can say is thank you Tony Bloom for bringing me some of the most memorable days of my life, and long many you continue to be in charge.